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REASON AND PARADOX IN MEDICAL AND FAMILY LAW: 
SHAPING CHILDREN’S BODIES 
 





Legal outcomes often depend on the adjudication of what may appear to be 
straightforward distinctions. In this article, we consider two such distinctions 
that appear in medical and family law deliberations: the distinction between 
religion and culture, and between therapeutic and non-therapeutic. These 
distinctions can impact what constitutes ‘reasonable parenting’ or a child’s 
‘best interests’ and thus the limitations that may be placed on parental 
actions. Such distinctions are often imagined to be asocial facts, there for the 
judge to discover. We challenge this view, however, by examining the 
controversial case of B and G [2015]. In this case, Sir James Munby stated 
that the cutting of both male and female children’s genitals for non-
therapeutic reasons constituted ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of the 
Children Act 1989. He went on to conclude, however, that while it can never 
be reasonable parenting to inflict any form of non-therapeutic genital cutting 
on a female child, such cutting on male children was currently tolerated. We 
argue that the distinctions between religion/culture and therapeutic/non-
therapeutic upon which Munby LJ relied in making this judgment cannot in 
fact ground categorically differential legal treatment of female and male 
children. We analyse these distinctions from a systems theoretical 
perspective - specifically with reference to local paradoxes - to call into 
question the current legal position. Our analysis suggests that conventional 
distinctions drawn between religion/culture and the therapeutic/non-
therapeutic in other legal contexts require much greater scrutiny than they 












Legal reasoning often coheres around the determination of what can appear to be 
binary distinctions. For example, the adjudication of whether an act was lawful or 
unlawful may depend upon an assessment of whether a course of action was 
reasonable/unreasonable, proportionate/disproportionate, careless/reckless, and so 
forth. In terms of criminal and civil law standards that delimit acceptable parental 
action, consideration of whether a practice is religious or cultural or whether an 
intervention is therapeutic or non-therapeutic may be similarly determinative. Practices 
described as religious or therapeutic in nature are typically afforded greater protection 
from interference by the state than those that are described as non-therapeutic or 
‘merely’ cultural. Neither of these distinctions are straightforward, however. As we 
shall demonstrate, rather than being ahistorical or apolitical in nature, dominant 
understandings of which practices do or do not deserve the labels ‘religious’ or 
‘therapeutic’ are shaped by competing value claims and by overlapping, often evolving 
contingencies of culture, power, gender, race, and social class. As Alice Ludvig notes, 
law’s ‘dichotomies are not “neutral”; they have been the means of fixing meaning in 
ways that secure power relations and inequalities in and of themselves’.1 
One particularly contentious area in which these binary distinctions are commonly 
drawn is the cutting of children’s genitals. When such cutting is done to female 
children, it is often said to be a non-religious cultural practice, and one which, 
moreover, has no therapeutic benefit: if legal protection is to be granted, therefore, it 
                                                 
*We wish to thank Joshua Warburton for his research assistance, and Richard Amesbury, James 
Chegwidden, Beverley Clough, Robert Darby, Mitchell Travis, Richard Shweder, Ilias Trispiotis, and the 
journal’s anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  
1 A Ludvig, ‘Differences between Women? Intersecting Voices in a Female Narrative’ (2006) 13(3) 
European Journal of Women’s Studies 245, 249. 
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should be to the girl and her unmodified genitals, rather than to those who might wish 
to cut them. When such cutting is done to male children, by contrast, it is commonly 
said to be a religious practice, and one with at least potential therapeutic benefit:2 
therefore, it must not be restricted - much less forbidden - by law. Accordingly, 
protection in this instance is afforded to the parents, or to the person or persons 
designated by the parents to cut the boy’s genitals. 
To interrogate these distinctions we turn to the English High Court decision of B and G 
[2015], in which Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, considered the 
current disparity in legal responses to male and female genital cutting.3 Potentially 
marking a shift in judicial thinking, Munby LJ found that both practices can constitute 
‘significant harm’.4  Yet as Carol Smart has noted, ‘harm’ is not ‘a transcendental 
notion which is automatically knowable and recognizable at any moment in history by 
any member of a culture’.5 Rather, it is a culture- and context-sensitive notion, which 
can be shaped by differing perceptions, assumptions, and values, and by conscious or 
unconscious stereotypes about the object(s) of evaluation. Accordingly, one of our 
aims in this article is to shed light on such factors as they bear on judgments about 
harm to children’s bodies - particularly insofar as these judgments diverge as a 
function of the child’s sex or gender. 
In the ruling by Munby LJ, such divergence re-emerged soon after the initial, 
apparently sex and gender neutral, judgment about ‘significant harm’. In other words, 
                                                 
2 Expert opinion is sharply divided. R Collier, ‘Ugly, Messy and Nasty Debate Surrounds Circumcision’ 
(2012) 184(1) Canadian Medical Association Journal E25; BD Earp, ‘Addressing Polarisation in Science’ 
(2015) 41(9) Journal of Medical Ethics 782.  
3 Re B and G (children) (care proceedings) [2015] EWFC 3. 
4 Ibid., para. 37. 
5 C Smart, ‘A History of Ambivalence and Conflict in the Discursive Construction of the “Child Victim” of 
Child Abuse’ (1999) 8(3) Social & Legal Studies 391, 392. 
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Munby LJ sought to ‘rescue’ law’s current position, which treats females and males 
differently, in the manner we have just described: by contrasting religion with culture 
and the therapeutic with the non-therapeutic as a way of distinguishing the two types 
of cutting. Although these distinctions are generally accepted in law, and used to 
evaluate a number of contested practices, we shall argue that in the case of childhood 
genital cutting, at least, they are not valid.6 Appealing to them, therefore, reveals deep 
contradictions in conventional legal reasoning.  
To explain these contradictions we draw on systems theory. Approaching law as an 
autopoietic or self-creating system (self-creating in the sense that it constitutes itself 
from its own systemic elements), one can begin to see how contradictions and even 
paradoxes are an intrinsic feature of legal change. Rather than seeing such paradoxes 
as a weakness of law, systems theoretical approaches take them to be a defining and 
generative feature – arising from the need for law to maintain credibility and legitimacy 
whilst negotiating its internal tensions. Our focus is on the local paradoxes 
underpinning Munby LJ’s ruling – ‘local’ in the sense employed by Oren Perez to 
                                                 
6 In this article, we focus on male and female genital cutting. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that some 
of our arguments also apply to genital ‘normalising’ surgeries on children born with intersex conditions. 
Space precludes us from extending our analysis here, but we would highlight the following critical 
assessments, some of which explore commonalities among male, female and intersex genital cutting 
practices: N Ehrenreich, ‘Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective Condemnation of 
Cultural Practices’ (2005) 40 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 71; M Fox, M Thomson, 
‘Cutting it: Surgical interventions and the sexing of children’ (2005) 12 Cardozo Journal of Law & 
Gender 82; I Morland, ‘Intimate Violations: Intersex and the Ethics of Bodily Integrity’ (2008) 18(3) 
Feminism & Psychology 425; M. Fox, M. Thomson, “Sexing the cherry: fixing masculinity” in N. Sullivan 
and S. Murray (eds) Queer(ing) Somatechnics: Critical Engagements with Bodily (Trans) Formations 
(2009), 107-126; JS Svoboda, ‘Promoting Genital Autonomy by Exploring Commonalities Between 
Male, Female, Intersex, and Cosmetic Female Genital Cutting’ (2013) 3(2) Global Discourse 237; M. 
Travis, ‘Accommodating Intersexuality in European Union Anti-Discrimination Law, (2014) 21 European 
Law Journal 180; F. Ammaturo, ‘Intersexuality and the “Right to Bodily Integrity”: Critical Reflections on 
Female Genital Cutting, Circumcision and Intersex “Normalising Surgeries” in Europe’ (2016)  25(5) 
Social & Legal Studies 591-610; M Newbold, ‘When Parents Choose Gender: Intersex, Children, and 
the Law’ (2016) 24(4) Medical Law Review 474-496. 
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include ‘doctrinal weaknesses and inconsistencies.’7 These inconsistencies, we argue, 
stem from a differential appraisal of children’s bodies that cannot be justified on the 
basis of an empirically defensible or conceptually lucid account of the harms to which 
they are exposed in having their genitals cut. Instead, such an appraisal rests more 
heavily on harm judgments that track questionable assumptions not only about sex 
and gender, as we have intimated, but also racial identity and ethnic affiliation.  
In what follows we show that there are substantial overlaps in both the physical 
consequences and symbolic meanings of male and female genital cutting, when the 
full spectrum of such practices is considered and like compared with like. Moreover, 
these consequences and meanings transcend boundaries of health, religion, and 
culture, undermining the usefulness of these categories for justifying sex-based 
distinctions. Drawing on a children’s rights perspective, we suggest that 
considerations of bodily integrity and self-determination provide a more compelling 
basis for assessing the permissibility of genital cutting, regardless of the individual’s 
sex or gender.8 
In so doing, we acknowledge the growing body of academic commentary arguing that 
neither religion nor culture can justify substantial intrusions into the bodies of children 
                                                 
7 See O Perez, ‘Law in the Air: A Prologue to the World of Legal Paradoxes’ in O Perez, G Teubner 
(eds) Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law (Hart: Oxford, 2006) 3, 22-26.  
8 A full discussion of children’s rights, and related debates over the status of parental rights, would take 
us too far afield. But the perspective of the child, and the notion of children’s rights to bodily integrity, 
self-determination, and an open future, are central to this debate. See, M Fox, M Thomson, 
‘Reconsidering “Best Interests”: Male Circumcision and the Rights of the Child’ in G Denniston et al. 
(ed), Circumcision and Human Rights (Springer: New York, 2009) 15. See further, B Shell‐Duncan 
‘From Health to Human Rights: Female Genital Cutting and the Politics of Intervention’ (2008) 110(2) 
American Anthropologist 225; DL DeLaet, ‘Framing Male Circumcision as a Human Rights Issue?’ 
(2009) 8(4) Journal of Human Rights 405; R Darby, ‘The Child's Right to an Open Future: is the 
Principle Applicable to Non-therapeutic Circumcision?’ (2013) 39(7) Journal of Medical Ethics, 463-468; 
RS Van Howe ‘Infant Circumcision: The Last Stand for The Dead Dogma of Parental (Sovereignal) 
Rights’ (2013) 39(7) Journal of Medical Ethics 475  
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or other non-consenting persons, particularly when such intrusions result in permanent 
alteration that the individual may later reasonably regard as a harm. With ritual genital 
cutting attracting increased legal and regulatory attention in a number of European 
jurisdictions and at the supra-national level, 9  and with commonplace assumptions 
about such cutting drawing heightened scrutiny from across disciplines, such an 
analysis is timely and essential. 
However, the implications of our analysis are not limited to the genital cutting debate. 
Successful claims to religious or therapeutic status can have a legitimising effect in 
family and medical law in the context of other contested practices. Given the primacy 
of bodily integrity within the cluster of rights that law seeks to protect and promote,10 
our discussion bears most directly on other potentially harmful childhood shaping 
interventions where the designation therapeutic/non-therapeutic is contested. This 
includes sterilization, ‘normalising’ surgery on children born with intersex conditions, 
‘virginity restoration’ (i.e. hymenorrhaphy), limb lengthening, growth attenuation, and 
so forth. To frame our analysis, we begin with an outline of B and G, followed by a 
discussion of some of the empirical and conceptual confusions that we claim underlie 
and undermine its conclusion.   
B and G 
B and G concerned care proceedings brought in the case of two children, B (a 4-year-
old boy) and G (a 3-year-old girl). The central questions raised by the case were: i) 
                                                 
9 SR Munzer, ‘Secularization, Anti-Minority Sentiment, and Cultural Norms in the German Circumcision 
Controversy’ (2015) 37(2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 503; JS Svoboda, 
‘Growing World Consensus to Leave Circumcision Decision to the Affected Individual’ (2015) 15(2) 
American Journal of Bioethics 46. 
10 M Fox, M Thomson, ‘Bodily Integrity, Embodiment and the Regulation of Parental Choice’ (2017) 
Journal of Law & Society (forthcoming). 
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whether G had been subject to female genital cutting (FGC); ii) if she had, did this 
amount to significant harm, and iii) what then, were the implications for her and her 
brother. It was agreed in the process of the hearing that if G had been subject to FGC, 
it was Type IV, using the typology set out by the World Health Organization (WHO).11 
Type IV is defined as ‘all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-
medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and 
cauterization’.12  
Given significant problems with the expert evidence, it was found that the local 
authority had not proven its case. That is, there was no evidence that G had in fact 
been subjected to FGC. Nevertheless, Munby LJ moved on to address Type IV, which, 
he argued, raised an issue ‘which cannot be shirked’ and which took him to the 
question of ‘male circumcision’.13 In explaining the court’s position, Munby LJ stated 
that whilst WHO Types I, II, and III FGC are ‘more invasive than male circumcision’,14 
some practices falling under Type IV FGC, such as pricking of the clitoral hood, are 
‘on any view much less invasive than male circumcision’.15 Further, he acknowledged 
                                                 
11 Note that the WHO uses the term ‘FGM’ for Female Genital ‘Mutilation’, which is also the term 
employed by Munby LJ. However, among scholars of genital cutting this term is highly controversial, 
having been criticized on numerous grounds, including its lack of value-neutrality, see B Shell-Duncan 
and Y Hernlund, (eds) Female “Circumcision" in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 2000); DS Davis, ‘Male and Female Genital Alteration: A Collision Course 
with the Law?’ (2001) 11 Health Matrix 487. Increasingly, ‘FGC’ for Female Genital Cutting is the 
preferred term, which we employ here. 
12 The WHO typology is: Type I—Partial/total removal of the clitoris and/or prepuce. Type Ia, removal 
of clitoral hood/prepuce only; Type Ib, removal of clitoris with prepuce. Type II—Partial/total removal of 
clitoris and labia minora, with/without excision of labia majora. Type III—Narrowing of vaginal orifice 
with creation of seal by cutting/appositioning labia minora and/or labia majora, with/without excision of 
clitoris. Type IV—defined above. WHO, ‘Female Genital Mutilation: Fact Sheet’ (World Health 
Organization, February 2016) at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ accessed 4 
January 2017 
13 Re B and G (n 3), 58. 
14 Ibid., 60.  
15 Ibid. 
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that Type Ia, cutting/removal of the clitoral hood or prepuce, ‘is physiologically 
somewhat analogous to male circumcision’.16 
In making these observations, Munby LJ aligned judicial thinking with an emerging 
consensus concerning clear similarities between male and female genital cutting when 
the full range of practices falling under those labels is considered. 17  His ruling 
therefore challenges the dominant view in both the legal and popular imaginations that 
such practices are fundamentally distinct. Looking to earlier case law, for example, 
Munby LJ’s judgment departs from that of Baroness Hale in Secretary of State for the 
Home Office v K [2006]18  in which she asserted that FGC ‘procedures vary from 
community to community but cannot in any way be compared to the removal of a 
boy’s foreskin’.19 Baroness Hale goes on to cite the UNICEF Innocenti Digest: 
In the case of girls and women, the phenomenon is a manifestation of deep-
rooted gender inequality that assigns them to an inferior position in society and 
                                                 
16 Ibid., (n 1) The procedures are analogous in that both alter/remove a genital prepuce; however, the 
penile prepuce is considerably larger: ~30-50 cm2 in the mature organ. BD Earp, ‘Do the Benefits of 
Male Circumcision Outweigh the Risks?’ (2015) 3 Frontiers in Pediatrics 18. 
17 DS Davis, ‘Male and Female Genital Alteration’ (n 11), 487; M Fox, M Thomson, ‘A Covenant with 
the Status Quo? Male Circumcision and the New BMA Guidance to Doctors’ (2005) 31(8) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 463; K Bell, ‘Genital Cutting and Western Discourses on Sexuality’ (2005) 19(2) Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly 125; DL DeLaet, ‘Framing Male Circumcision as a Human Rights Issue?’ (n 8); 
M Dustin, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK—Challenging the Inconsistencies’ (2010) 17(1) 
European Journal of Women's Studies 7; M van den Brink, J Tigchelaar ‘Shaping Genitals, Shaping 
Perceptions: A Frame Analysis of Male and Female Circumcision’ (2012) 30 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 417; JS Svoboda, ‘Promoting Genital Autonomy’ (n 6); BD Earp, ‘Female Genital 
Mutilation and Male Circumcision: Toward an Autonomy-based Ethical Framework’ (2015) 5(1) 
Medicolegal and Bioethics 89. 
18 Secretary of State for the Home Office v K [2006] UKHL 46. 
19 Ibid., 91. See also Lord Justice Moore-Bick in SS (Malaysia) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2013] EWCA Civ 888. That is not to say that the potential harm of MGC has not been 
recognised by the judiciary. See, for example, Wall J’s judgement in Re J (child’s religious upbringing 
and circumcision) [1999] 2 FLR 678 - noting that circumcision is potentially traumatic and may cause 
unnecessary pain and suffering.  
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has profound physical and social consequences. This is not the case for male 
circumcision, which may help to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS.20 
Hale LJ’s statement is indicative of the dominant Western understanding of male and 
female genital cutting practices. Yet this understanding is mistaken in several respects. 
Before turning to the systems theoretical approach we use to address how law in this 
area has developed and may continue to change, we first highlight some of the key 
misunderstandings that underpin the prevailing view.   
Making Distinctions 
Theodore Bennett writes that male and female genital cutting ‘are discursively 
conceptualized and legally treated as entirely different, even oppositional, 
practices’. 21 This is in tension, however, with the fact that both the degree of 
invasiveness of the interventions themselves, as well as the underlying motivations, 
root causes, rationales, and associated symbolic meanings are at times quite similar, 
the same, or even reversed, when comparing like cases.22 For example, the notion 
that FGC is always associated with or a consequence of sexist and patriarchal norms, 
representing a lower status for women and girls, has been described by one expert as 
a ‘gross oversimplification’;23 while at the same time, the patriarchal origins of male 
genital cutting in some societies (e.g., within Judaism) has been noted many times.24  
                                                 
20 Ibid., 93. 
21 T Bennett, Cuts and Criminality: Body Alteration in Legal Discourse (Ashgate Publishing: Surrey, 
2015), 68. 
22 H Lightfoot-Klein, ‘Similarities in Attitudes and Misconceptions about Male and Female Sexual 
Mutilations’ in GC Denniston et al. (eds) Sexual Mutilations (Springer: New York, 1997); M van den 
Brink, J Tigchelaar ‘Shaping Genitals’ (n 17), 417. 
23 L Wade, ‘Learning from “Female Genital Mutilation”: Lessons from 30 Years of Academic Discourse’ 
(2012) 12(1) Ethnicities 26. See also AL Obiora, ‘Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and 
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Specifics will help justify these claims. While it is true that in certain geographical 
contexts, particularly in parts of northeast Africa, FGC has become associated with 
pre-existing cultural and religious norms that emphasize female chastity and sexual 
purity in some groups, this association is not universal.25 For example, with regard to 
the FGC-practicing Kono ethnic group of Sierra Leone - the country of origin of the 
applicant in Secretary of State for the Home Office v K - ‘there is no cultural obsession 
with feminine chastity, virginity, or women’s sexual fidelity … because the role of the 
biological father is considered marginal and peripheral to the central matricentric 
unit’. 26  In Kono society, as in numerous other African ethnic groups, the FGC 
ceremony is organized and carried out entirely by women, while the analogous 
ceremony for boys is managed entirely by men: in both cases, the primary intention is 
not to reduce the initiates’ sexual pleasure (nor to reify a lower status for the 
females),27 but is rather to confer on both sexes a community-recognized status as 
mature adults, earned through their participation in a symbolically complex, morally 
transformative, and, in some cases, deliberately painful rite of passage.28  
Strikingly, the anthropological record reveals few or no FGC-practicing societies that 
do not also practice male genital cutting or MGC, often in parallel and under similar 
                                                                                                                                                          
Intransigence in the Campaign against Female Circumcision’ (1997) 47 Case Western Reserve Law 
Review 275. 
24 MS Kimmel, ‘The Kindest Un-cut’ (2001) 16(3) Tikkun 43; SD Cohen, Why aren’t Jewish Women 
Circumcised? Gender & Covenant in Judaism (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2005) 560-578.  
25 FS Ahmadu, ‘Rites and Wrongs: An Insider/Outsider Reflects on Power and Excision’ in B Shell-
Duncan, Y Hernlund (eds) Female “Circumcision” (n 11); J Abdulcadir et al. ‘Seven Things to Know 
about Female Genital Surgeries in Africa’ (2012) 42(6) The Hastings Center Report 19. 
26 Ibid., FS Ahmadu, 285. 
27 See, e.g., SM James, CC Robertson (eds) Genital Cutting and Transnational Sisterhood (University 
of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 2005). 
28 B Shell-Duncan, Y Hernlund (eds) Female “Circumcision” (n 11); HD Lyons, ‘Genital Cutting: The 
Past and Present of a Polythetic Category’ (2007) 53(4) Africa Today 3.  
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conditions.29  As John Caldwell and colleagues have argued, the failure of Anglo-
American law, and of Western attitudes more generally, ‘to relate the two types of 
circumcision is curious . . . because they have probably been regarded by most 
Africans as being related for aeons’.30 To return to Secretary of State for the Home 
Office v K, it is worth noting that Bingham LJ is quick to draw a sharp distinction 
between MGC and FGC based on allegedly differing symbolic meanings. With respect 
to FGC, he argues, 
 
The contrast with male circumcision is obvious: where performed for ritualistic 
rather than health reasons, male circumcision may be seen as symbolizing the 
dominance of the male. FGM may ensure a young woman’s acceptance in … 
society, but she is accepted on the basis of her institutionalised inferiority.31 
 
This analysis is, in certain respects, too easy. To begin, Lord Bingham’s assessment 
of Sierra Leonean society is inconsistent with that of anthropologists who specialize in 
the region, such as Fuambai Ahmadu, a Sierra Leonean-American who has written 
extensively about female and male initiation ceremonies among the Kono ethnic group 
in that context. According to Ahmadu, 
 
Kono culture promulgates a dual-sex ideology, which is manifested in political 
and social organization, sexual division of labor, and, notably, the presence of 
powerful female and male secret societies. The existence and power of Bundu, 
the women's secret sodality, suggest positive links between excision, women's 
                                                 
29 J Abdulcadir et al. ‘Seven Things’ (n 25); RA Shweder ‘The Goose and the Gander: The Genital 
Wars’ (2013) 3(2) Global Discourse 348. 
30 JC Caldwell et al., ‘Male and Female Circumcision in Africa from a Regional to a Specific Nigerian 
Examination’ (1997) 44(8) Social Science and Medicine 1181. 
31 Home Office v K (n 18), 31. 
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religious ideology, their power in domestic relations, and their high profile in the 
‘public’ arena.32  
 
There are certainly normative gender roles in Kono society, as there are in all 
societies. However, it is far from evident that the role(s) for Kono females is 
associated with a ‘lower’ status, much less a kind of ‘institutionalized inferiority’ as 
Lord Bingham asserts. Ahmadu cautions that ‘Scholars must be wary of imposing 
Western religious, philosophical, and intellectual assumptions that tend to place 
enormous emphasis on masculinity and its symbols in the creation of culture itself’, 
leading to the automatic conclusion that the male roles must be of higher status.33 To 
the contrary, according to Ahmadu, women in Kono culture occupy a complementary 
role to men that is just as valued in the local ontology. Making the more general point 
with reference to other FGC-practicing groups, Christine Walley notes that whilst the 
anthropological record supports the view that gender inequality is widespread: 
the cultural and historical particulars of how gender relations are constructed 
differently in different places, and the alternate sources of power and authority 
that women often hold, are ignored in these generalized assumptions about the 
oppression of third-world women.34 
Indeed, such generalized assumptions may, themselves, be seen as expressions of 
patriarchy, as Arianne Shahvisi has recently argued: ‘An extension of … patriarchy is 
the widespread idea that Europeans must protect women of colour from the 
                                                 
32 FS Ahmadu, ‘Rites and Wrongs’ (n 25), 285. 
33 Ibid. 
34 CJ Walley, ‘Searching for "Voices": Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female 
Genital Operations’ (1997) 12(3) Cultural Anthropology 405, 420. 
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“barbarism” of men of colour. It is from this misled belief that [Western] hypocrisy 
around FGM stems’. As she illustrates:  
UK law codifies the idea that adult women of particular cultures are not as 
capable of making their own decisions as are other women, let alone as 
capable as men. For, if a woman requests a labiaplasty (say) from a private 
cosmetic surgeon in the UK, her ethnicity will likely be used to determine her 
consent status, and in turn whether or not the procedure can occur legally. The 
current law [therefore] enforces differential access to [genital-altering] 
procedures on the basis of race.35  
Turning to MGC and patriarchy, there are indeed some contexts in which the genital 
cutting of males is more directly associated with their elevated status, and thus with a 
lowered status for females. In Jewish ritual practice, for instance, only males are 
entitled to have their genitals cut as part of a perceived divine covenant. Shaye D. 
Cohen, the Littauer Professor of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy at Harvard 
University argues that of all the rituals from which women are excluded by rabbinic 
culture, ‘the exclusion from circumcision is at once the most obvious and the most 
problematic’. As he explains, ‘the fundamental inferiority, marginality and Otherness of 
women were so self-evident [throughout Jewish history] that the presence of a 
covenantal mark on the bodies of men, and its absence from the bodies of women, 
seemed natural and inevitable’. 36  Contemporary Jews, Cohen argues, ‘especially 
those sensitive to gender issues … might wish to argue that male circumcision needs 
                                                 
35 A Shahvisi, ‘Why UK Doctors Should be Troubled by Female Genital Mutilation Legislation’ (2017) 
Clinical Ethics (forthcoming). 
36 SD Cohen, ‘Why aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised?’ (1997) 9(3) Gender & History 560, 574. 
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to be abolished or de-emphasized as a ritual marker precisely because it has 
functioned within history to discriminate invidiously against women’.37  
The lesson from these examples - just two of many more that could be raised - is that 
the non-physical ‘meanings’ of male and female genital cutting differ from group to 
group, such that there is no single overarching symbolic framework that can 
quarantine the practices from one another on the basis of sex or gender.38 When this 
lesson is combined with the ‘overlaps’ in physical consequences between the two 
procedures (depending on type) as recognized by Munby LJ from the bench for the 
first time, a puzzle is raised as to why they have conventionally been seen, at least in 
Western discourse, as being fundamentally distinct. 
There are a number of solutions to this puzzle, with cultural familiarity being among 
the most significant. 39  Put simply, the Western world’s familiarity with Jewish 
circumcision since antiquity, has contrasted with its longstanding ‘ignorance of female 
circumcision … the discovery [of which] during the eighteenth century was met with a 
combination of incredulity, fascination, and horror’.40 In more recent times, it was not 
until the 1970s that African FGC practices were brought into the popular 
consciousness (often without any reference to their coincident male counterparts, 
some of which were more physically harmful), primarily through the work of activists 
following Fran Hosken who interpreted such cutting as evidence of global domination 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 561. 
38 L Leonard, ‘Interpreting Female Genital Cutting: Moving Beyond the Impasse’ (2000) 11(1) Annual 
Review of Sex Research 158.  
39 N Sullivan, ‘The Price to Pay for our Common Good: Genital Modification and the Somatechnologies 
of Cultural (In)difference’ (2007) 17(3) Social Semiotics 395. 
40 R Darby, ‘Moral Hypocrisy or Intellectual Inconsistency?’ (2016) 26(2) Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 155, 156. 
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of women by men. 41  But as Walley notes, in their ‘depiction of female genital 
operations for an international audience, the practices became largely severed from 
their sociocultural context’. Thus, despite the fact that male and female cutting was 
performed side by side in many of the African ethnic groups whose cultural traditions 
were being written about, in the ‘Western-oriented literature opposing such practices 
there was an exclusive focus on the tormenting of girls, if not solely by men, then by a 
monolithic patriarchy’.42  
This dichotomous discourse continues today. When female genital cutting is raised in 
public conversation, it is usually the most severe forms in the least sanitary conditions 
that are emphasized (the young girl in a remote African village being cut and 
infibulated by a village elder), with limited mention of the more ‘mild’ forms of FGC, 
such as ritual nicking of the clitoral prepuce as is carried out by health professionals in 
some Muslim-majority countries including Malaysia.43 On the other hand, when male 
circumcision is the focus of public discourse, it is most often described in its least 
invasive forms, and in sanitary conditions such as a hospital setting (common in the 
United States), with limited awareness of the more extreme and unsanitary forms of 
MGC that are carried out in other contexts (for example, ritual circumcision among the 
Xhosa of South Africa, where more than 400 boys died between 2008 and 2014 due 
to complications associated with their initiations).44 Such thinking both stems from, and 
                                                 
41 K Bell, ‘Genital Cutting’ (n 17).  
42 CJ Walley, ‘Searching’ (n 34), 418. 
43 See, AK Rashid et al. ‘The Practice of Female Genital Mutilation among the Rural Malays in North 
Malaysia’ (2010) 9(1) Internet Journal of Third World Medicine 1. 
44 M Douglas, A Nyembezi ‘Challenges Facing Traditional Male Circumcision in the Eastern Cape’ 
(Human Sciences Research Council, 2015) at 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/6391/Presentation%20-
%20Challenges%20facing%20traditional%20male%20circumcision%20in%20the%20Eastern%20Cape
.pdf accessed 4 January 2017; LL Gonzalez, ‘South Africa: Over Half a Million Initiates Maimed under 
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perpetuates, a gendered opposition that does not reflect the full reality. As 
anthropologist Zachary Androus has argued: 
 
 
The fact of the matter is that what’s done to some girls [in some cultures] is 
worse than what’s done to some boys, and what’s done to some boys [in some 
cultures] is worse than what’s done to some girls. By collapsing all of the many 
different types of procedures performed into a single set for each sex, 
categories are created that do not accurately describe any situation that 
actually occurs anywhere in the world.45 
 
Consistent with this observation is Munby LJ’s discussion of the ‘curious situation’ 
facing the court. Noting the Muslim identity of the family, he reasoned that it was likely 
that B either was, or would, in due course be circumcised. Yet: 
 
G’s FGM Type IV (had it been proved) would have been relied upon … as 
justifying the adoption of both children, even though on any objective view it 
might be thought that G would have [been] subjected to a process much less 
invasive, no more traumatic (if, indeed, as traumatic) and with no greater long-
term consequences, whether physical, emotional or psychological, than the 
process to which B has been or will be subjected.46 
                                                                                                                                                          
the Knife’ (All Africa, 20 June 2014) at http://allafrica.com/stories/201406251112.html accessed 4 
January 2017 
45 ZT Androus, ‘The US, FGM, and Global Rights to Bodily Integrity’ (Rothermere American Institute: 
US and Global Human Rights, University of Oxford, November 2004) at 
http://www.zacharyandrous.com/The%20US%20FGM%20and%20Global%20HR.pdf accessed 16 June 
2016, 3.  
46 Re B and G (n 3), 62-63. 
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Having made these observations, Munby LJ turned to the specifics of the legal case 
before him. Section 31 of the Children Act 1989 provides that before the State can 
intervene, the local authority must first prove ‘significant harm’. In accepting that all 
forms of FGC constitute ‘significant harm’ for the purposes of care proceedings, 
Munby J then asserts that: 
Given the comparison between what is involved in male circumcision and FGM 
Type IV, to dispute that the more invasive procedure involves the significant 
harm involved in the less invasive procedure would seem almost irrational. In 
my judgement, if Type IV amounts to significant harm… then the same must be 
so of male circumcision.47 
Justifying Distinctions 
This assertion is significant. It is the first time in English law that MGC has been 
described as a ‘significant harm’. Nevertheless, since this is the threshold test for care 
proceedings, if ‘significant harm’ is identified, the question then becomes whether it 
was a result of parental care that fell below what it would be ‘reasonable to expect’ of 
a parent. It is here that Munby LJ identifies a ‘clear distinction’ between female and 
male genital cutting: 
 
There are, after all, at least two important distinctions between the two. FGM 
has no basis in any religion; male circumcision is often performed for religious 
reasons. FGM has no medical justification and confers no health benefits; male 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 69 (emphasis added). 
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circumcision is seen by some (although opinions are divided) as providing 
hygienic or prophylactic benefits.48 
In other words, Munby LJ rationalises the legal distinction between male and female 
genital cutting in terms of ‘reasonable parenting’ by pointing to purported differences 
between religion and culture, and between the therapeutic and non-therapeutic. In 
resorting to these distinctions, Munby LJ’s ruling is, in one sense, a conservative 
judgement. But there is a certain nuance in his choice of language which hints at a 
more progressive view. This concerns the question of harm and why the law would 
respond differently to the children in front of him if both had their genitals cut: 
The explanation, it must be, is simply that in 2015 the law… is still prepared to 
tolerate non-therapeutic male circumcision… while no longer being willing to 
tolerate FGM in any of its forms. Certainly current judicial thinking seems to be 
that there is no equivalence between the two.49 
The language is tentative and contingent, both temporally and legally. In terms of legal 
contingency, his final ruling is on the ‘narrow’ legal question of the reach of Section 31. 
In terms of temporality, Munby LJ states that ‘in 2015’ and in light of ‘current judicial 
thinking’ law is ‘still prepared to tolerate non-therapeutic’50 cutting of male children’s 
genitals. One way to read this hedge is as follows: ‘for now, at this time, we still let this 
happen’. Assuming that is a fair reading, the suggestion seems to be that the situation 
is untenable. Continuing to use B and G to frame our analysis, in the next section we 
turn to a systems theoretical approach to explain the processes of legal change. This 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 72. 
49 Ibid., 64-65. 
50 Ibid., 64 (emphasis added). 
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approach foregrounds the importance of scrutinising distinctions that serve to underpin 
the legitimacy of current social and legal arrangements. 
 
RATIONALITY, IRRATIONALITY, AND THE LEGAL METHOD 
 
From Munby’s tentative language one may infer an implicit understanding of how law 
changes over time. This understanding has a teleological dimension according to 
which society and law are purposefully developing toward a progressive and logical 
end: here, the protection of all children, regardless of sex or gender, from significant 
bodily harm. As John Harrington has written more generally of beliefs about change in 
medical law, the ‘goals of universality and freedom are taken to be immanent… [t]he 
law will work itself clear of impediments to reason and liberty.’51 
Systems theoretical approaches provide an alternative model of legal change.52 Such 
approaches position law as a recursive practice that is operationally closed to its 
environment.53 As such, the legal system makes and remakes itself from its own 
normative resources (court judgements, for example, rely on statutory provision and 
precedent cases), while its wider environment is constituted by other self-referential 
                                                 
51 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox and Plausibility: The Dynamic of Change in Medical Law’ (2014) 22(3) 
Medical Law Review 305, 305. Nevertheless, Munby LJ also acknowledges less ‘logical’ modes of legal 
change, quoting Holmes J (from The Common Law, 1881): ‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, 
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed’. This does not seem to satisfy Munby LJ, however: ‘the curiosity’ before him ‘remains’. Re B 
and G (n 3), 64. 
52 R Nobles, D Schiff, ‘Review of Perez & Teubner (eds) Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law’ 
(2007) 70(3) Modern Law Review 505, 511. 
53 Whilst it is operationally – or normatively – closed, it is ‘cognitively’ open, drawing on expertise and 
knowledge claims from other systems such as medicine, as we go on to acknowledge. 
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social systems (science, medicine, politics and so forth) as well as the natural world.54 
This combination of systemic closure and self-reference establishes that ‘a decision 
on lawfulness cannot be replaced by one on truth, profitability or therapeutic benefit 
and remain a legal decision’.55 
A systems theoretical understanding of law recognises that there is no foundational 
justification for the distinction between law and non-law. The question of ‘how can we 
rightly or wrongly differentiate the right and the wrong’56 is the foundational paradox 
that results from this initial distinction - the essentially arbitrary (or violent) drawing of a 
line that designates one side as system (the law) and the other as environment. 
Hence law, esteemed in classic jurisprudence as the negation of violence – the 
Hobbesian contract – ‘in fact proceeds from it.’57 The reproduction of the distinction 
between law and non-law in every subsequent legal operation has the effect of 
embedding contingency throughout the legal system.58 This means that law is ‘binding, 
but provisional; normative, but arbitrary’.59  
Paradox is not only a defining feature of law but is also generative of it. For as an 
autopoietic system, law ‘cannot but find justification in [its] own circularity and cannot 
but produce regularities … that govern the transformation of their own irregularities’.60 
This circularity can be seen both in the foundational sense just outlined, but also in the 
                                                 
54 See N Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal 
System’ (1991-92) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419, 1420. 
55 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox’ (n 51), 309 (emphasis added). 
56 N Luhmann, ‘The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law and Legal History’ (1988) 
15(2) Journal of Law & Society 153-165, 154. 
57 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox’ (n 51), 310. 
58 G Teubner ‘“And God Laughed”: Indeterminacy, Self-Reference, and Paradox in Law’ (1990) 7 
Stanford Literature Review 15, 26. 
59 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox’ (n 51), 310. 
60 G Teubner, ‘How The Law Thinks: Towards A Constructivist Epistemology of Law’ (1989) 23(5) Law 
& Society Review 727, 736. 
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form of ‘local’ paradoxes - those ‘decisional paradoxes of daily legal practice’.61 These 
arise as law addresses contingency in its daily operations and responds to dilemmas 
and pressures that are generated by social and political change. Included among 
these paradoxes are inconsistencies, contradictions, and weaknesses in legal 
reasoning.62  
In managing such local paradoxes, law relies on processes of distinction and 
displacement. In the context of medical and family law, distinctions can be structured 
around categories such as age, reasonableness, parent, risk, and – as in the present 
case – the religious and therapeutic. The legitimacy or plausibility of distinctions may 
then be supported by the displacement of the reasoning, and at times decision-making, 
into a different social field (such as medicine) relevant to the claimed distinction. 
Harrington illustrates this process with the example of the law governing the capacity 
of minors to consent to contraceptive treatment, an example that helpfully (for our 
purposes) straddles family and medical law: 
A distinction is drawn between over-16s and under-16s: the former are 
presumed competent, the latter must prove that they are. But … the actual 
decision on competence in the case of under-16s is displaced to the clinical 
judgement of the doctor. The underlying contingency of legal decision-making 
in this field will be effectively concealed for as long as this regime of distinction 
and displacement holds good.63 
                                                 
61 G Teubner ‘Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter’ in O Perez, G Teubner 
(eds) Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2006), 50. 
62 O Perez, ‘Law in the Air’ (n 7), 22-26. 
63 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox’ (n 51) 311 
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Rather than a process of logical development, therefore, we have a dynamic of legal 
change that is ordered through processes of distinction and displacement. A local 
paradox will be ‘solved’ by a process that relies on (increasingly fine) distinctions and 
– at times – the mobilisation of knowledge claims or decision-making from another 
social field. Paradoxes cannot be truly eliminated, however. Instead, they can only be 
bypassed by the drawing of further system-internal distinctions,64 or by displacement 
into the environment. The task of making such strategies plausible is one that belongs 
necessarily to the judge.65 
This understanding of the basis for legal reasoning can help us make sense of Munby 
LJ’s judgement in B and G, as well as the wider discursive field within which it sits. 
The inconsistent treatment of male and female genital cutting has typically been 
managed by drawing distinctions on the basis of harm. So, FGC is constructed as 
always harmful no matter how slight the intervention nor how sterile the equipment 
used, whereas MGC is constructed as always a benign parental choice, no matter 
how much of the foreskin is excised or the means by which this takes place.66 Yet this 
distinction strains credulity. Because law’s distinctions and displacements must be 
perceived as reasonable for it to maintain its credibility, a tension is created that must 
be resolved.  
                                                 
64 See J Hendry, C King, ‘How Far is Too Far? Theorising Non-conviction-based Asset Forfeiture’ 
(2015) 11(4) International Journal of Law in Context 398, 404. 
65 J Harrington, ‘Of Paradox’ (n 51), 306. 
66 Indeed, in the latter case, the risk of harm is typically reduced to and equated with the risk of ‘surgical 
complications’, R Darby, ‘Risks, Benefits, Complications and Harms’ (2015) 25(1) Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 1; BD Earp, ‘Infant Circumcision and Adult Penile Sensitivity’ (2016) 7(4) Trends in 
Urology & Men's Health 17. Even more peculiarly, in the case of MGC but not FGC, the risk of harm is 
often articulated in terms failure to cut male children - e.g., the child will be harmed due to being teased 
for having unmodified genitals or face other social disadvantages. When similar points are raised 
concerning ‘uncircumcised’ females, however, what is proposed is a change to social norms, not their 
genitals.  BD Earp, R Darby, ‘Circumcision, Sexual Experience, and Harm’ (2017) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (in press).  
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Whilst much of the immediate commentary on B and G interprets it as reasserting the 
distinction between male and female forms of genital cutting,67  or actively fails to 
engage with Munby LJ’s reasoning (at times uncritically restating the assumptions he 
challenges),68 we see the case as providing the potential for a shift in judicial thinking. 
Munby LJ no longer accepts the blanket harm distinction that has been automatically 
asserted in previous rulings, such as Secretary of State for the Home Office v K. It is 
no longer plausible due to the simple fact that there are legally prohibited forms of 
FGC that are on any view less physically harmful than even the most mild yet legally 
tolerated forms of MGC. According to Munby LJ, therefore, both male and female 
children suffer ‘significant harm’ in the eyes of the law.  
Munby LJ’s reconsideration of harm acts as a (momentary) ‘reparadoxification’: his 
statement foregrounds the inconsistent logic of the current legal position. How, then, is 
this paradox managed? In the case of B and G it is managed by drawing distinctions 
based on, and displacing responsibility into, the domains of religion and medicine. 
However, the stability of this solution is open to question. As Teubner argues, partial 
or temporary management of inconsistencies along one dimension ‘promises no 
solution of the crisis, but at most its … postponement, concealment, [and] repression. 
It is only a matter of time before the crisis breaks out again.’ 69  One possibility, 
therefore, is that, just as the prior distinction relying on (gendered) understandings of 
                                                 
67 See, for example, G Morris, ‘What Can be Learnt from the First FGM Case?’ (lexisnexis, 4 February 
2015) http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/family/what-can-be-learnt-from-the-first-fgm-case/ accessed 16 June 
2016; R English, ‘Male Circumcision can be Part of “Reasonable Parenting”, but No Form of FGM is 
Acceptable – Family Court’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 18 January 2015) 
https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2015/01/18/male-circumcision-can-be-part-of-reasonable-parenting-but-
no-form-of-fgm-is-acceptable-family-court/ accessed 25 September 2016. 
68 See, for example, RD McAlister, ‘A Dangerous Muddying of the Waters?’ (2016) 24(2) Medical Law 
Review 259. 
69 G Teubner, ‘Dealing with Paradoxes’ (n 61), 48.  
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harm has lost its plausibility - at least to Munby LJ - so too will the new distinctions 
relying on religion and medicine. In this context, ‘scholarly and other critiques may 
function as “irritations” provoking the legal system to reconsider’ its temporary and 
partial solutions. 70  In the following sections, we undertake such an analysis by 
questioning the plausibility of Munby LJ’s distinctions and displacements - that is, his 
attempted ‘deparadoxifications’ - before returning to the implications of this 
assessment for legal change. 
 
THE THERAPEUTIC/NON-THERAPEUTIC DISTINCTION 
 
We begin with the distinction drawn between the therapeutic and the non-therapeutic. 
To understand the relationship between gender, genital cutting, and medicine, it is 
useful to consider some of the historical factors that led to the adoption of MGC by 
Anglophone doctors in the nineteenth-century. After providing this brief historical 
context we identify problems with the frequent assertion that MGC is therapeutic whilst 
FGC has no health benefits.  
Male circumcision emerged at a time of medical experimentation on the genitals of 
both sexes. Male and female genitals were subject to exploratory cutting, cauterizing 
and other interventions aimed at ‘curing’ a number of related Victorian scourges 
including hysteria, masturbation, degeneracy, insanity, and neurasthenia. 71  At the 
centre of this experimentation was a desire to manage sexuality and fears of sexual 
excess in both sexes. Thus FGC was embraced in a number of European countries 
                                                 
70 J Harrington, Towards A Rhetoric of Medical Law (Routledge Glasshouse, 2017), 26.  
71 GP Miller, ‘Circumcision: Cultural-legal Analysis’ (2002) 9 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the 
Law 497; M Thomson, Endowed: Regulating the Male Sexed Body (Routledge: London, 2008). 
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and the United States, although it was treated with scepticism in the UK by most 
doctors (with a handful of notable exceptions).72 Whilst medicine’s experimentation 
with clitoridectomies and other ‘clinical’ interventions aimed at the vulva was fairly 
short lived, 73  the 1890s saw male circumcision become routine in Anglophone 
nations.74 The entrenchment of MGC at that time has been explained in terms of 
cultural anxieties regarding hygiene, masturbation, and sexually transmitted 
diseases, 75  which saw the foreskin become ‘the most vilified normal anatomical 
structure of the body’.76 
Cultural anxieties concerning masturbation were particularly influential and focused on 
the individual child (who risked enfeeblement, paralyzing lethargy, and perhaps 
insanity), 77  the family (threatened by men more interested in ‘self-pleasure’ than 
procreation),78 and the ruling classes (a weakened ruling class ‘stock’ was seen as 
threatened by working class and immigrant populations who were perceived to be 
stronger and reproducing at a greater rate).79 As Michel Foucault notes in The History 
of Sexuality, ‘precocious sexuality was presented from the eighteenth century to the 
end of the nineteenth as an epidemic menace that risked compromising not only the 
                                                 
72 R Darby, A Surgical Temptation: The Demonization of the Foreskin and the Rise of Circumcision in 
Britain (Chicago University Press: Chicago, 2005), 143. The best-known advocate of ‘female 
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73 However, note that FGC was available as a ‘medical’ procedure on some health insurance plans - 
chiefly as a treatment for such conditions as ‘hysteria’ - in the US until the 1970s. SB Rodriguez, 
Female Circumcision and Clitoridectomy in the United States (University of Rochester Press: Rochester, 
2014). 
74 R Darby, Surgical Temptation (n 72), 143. 
75 R Darby, ‘Circumcision as a Prevention of Masturbation: A Review of the Historiography’ (2003) 36 
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76 CJ Cold, JR Taylor, ‘The Prepuce’ (1999) 83 BJU International 34. 
77 M Thomson, Endowed, (n 71). 
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future health of adults but the future of the entire society and species’.80 Against this 
backdrop, MGC was believed to militate against masturbation as it reduced the 
incidence of adhesions and irritations which would otherwise lead to the penis being 
touched, thus encouraging ‘self-abuse’.81 Some advocates of circumcision believed 
that the anti-masturbation effects were bolstered by the pain of circumcision, which 
would create an association in the mind of the child between touching the penis and 
pain.82  
This early adoption of MGC as an individual and population level health intervention 
has circulated in different guises since this period. Whilst claims that now appear 
outlandish (that MGC will cure asthma, gout, alcoholism, malnutrition, eczema, and so 
forth)83 have diminished, certain associations have persisted. Early pro-circumcision 
anti-masturbation narratives were often linked not just with claims about hygiene, but 
also claims regarding sexually transmitted diseases. As a result, circumcision became 
an intended prophylaxis against (incurable) syphilis and was later mobilised against 
gonorrhoea.84  
In contemporary terms, MGC continues to be promoted by some medical figures, 
primarily situated in the US, on the basis that it may reduce the risk of urinary tract 
infections (UTIs), some sexually transmitted infections, and penile cancer, among 
other diseases. With respect to UTIs, boys with normally developing anatomy have an 
approximately 1% risk of infection in the first few years of life regardless of 
                                                 
80 M Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Penguin: London, 1990), 146. 
81 GP Miller, ‘Cultural-legal Analysis’ (n 71), 527. 
82 See, for example, AW Johnson, ‘On an Injurious Habit Occasionally Met with in Infancy and Early 
Childhood’ (1860) 7 Lancet 344.  
83 GP Miller ‘Cultural-legal Analysis’ (n 71), 527. 
84 M Fox, M Thomson, ‘HIV/AIDS and Male Circumcision: Discourses of Race and Masculinity’ in M 
Fineman, M Thomson (eds) Masculinity, Feminism and Law (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2013), 97-113. 
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circumcision status, and these can be cured with antibiotics as they are for girls. As 
Benatar and Benatar explain, ‘UTI does not occur in 99.85% of circumcised infant 
males and in 98.5% of un-circumcised infant boys.’85 Accordingly, it would take more 
than 100 circumcisions to prevent a single UTI.86 Concerning penile cancer, this is 
rare in developed countries, such that it would take between 909 and 322,000 
circumcisions to prevent a single case. 87  This leaves primarily the claimed risk-
reduction concerning sexually transmitted infections, which are preventable without 
surgery, often curable with antibiotics, and, if not curable, at least manageable with 
medications.    
Notwithstanding these caveats, circumcision has recently been proposed as a public 
health response to HIV/AIDS, focused in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, 
evidence from three Randomized Control Trials suggests a partial protective effect of 
adult, voluntary circumcision against female-to-male transmission of HIV in areas with 
high base rates of such transmission and low baseline circumcision prevalence.88 The 
scientific validity and ethics of these trials have been hotly debated.89 More importantly, 
however, the relevance of these findings to circumcision of infants or young children, 
especially in more developed countries with different epidemiological environments 
and patterns of HIV transmission, is unknown. The balance of opinion among global 
                                                 
85 M Benatar, D Benatar, 'Between Prophylaxis and Child Abuse: The Ethics of Neonatal Male 
Circumcision' (2003) 3 American Journal of Bioethics 35, 40. 
86 AAP, 'Male Circumcision' (2012) 130 Pediatrics e756  
87 Ibid. 
88 See, M Fox, M Thomson, ‘HIV/AIDS and Circumcision’ (n 84), 798; M Fox, M Thomson, ‘The New 
Politics of Male Circumcision: HIV/AIDS, Health Law and Social Justice’ (2012) 32(2) Legal Studies 255. 
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health authorities is that there is little or no such relevance.90 Nevertheless, as has 
been evident throughout the history of medicalised MGC, the purported benefits have 
become entrenched in public - including legal - discourse. 
In this context, it is worth considering the putative benefits of circumcision in relation to 
other modes of health-promotion. To begin, it is likely that removing tissue from most 
locations on a child’s body would reduce the future risk of medical problems affecting 
that tissue or introduced to other parts of the body through it. Yet as Eike-Henner 
Kluge argues, if this logic were accepted more generally, ‘all sorts of medical 
conditions would be implicated’ and we would find ourselves ‘operating nonstop on 
just about every part of the human body’. 91  So, routinely removing parts of the 
paediatric vulva, such as the labia minora, for instance, might come to be seen as a 
sensible means of reducing the future risk of vulvar cancer in female individuals 
(according to this framework). Yet it is currently impermissible to collect the data that 
would be needed to support such an intervention, since neonatal or early-childhood 
labiaplasty is illegal in Western countries.  
The question, therefore, is not whether certain health benefits may in fact follow from 
simply removing the tissue or body part in question, but whether those benefits are 
sufficient to outweigh the costs and harms of the intervention (physical, monetary, and 
moral) in light of alternative modes of prevention that are less risky and less invasive, 
as well as more effective and less ethically contentious.92 Given this analysis, the 
                                                 
90 JA Bossio et al., ‘A Review of the Current State of the Male Circumcision Literature’ (2014) 11(12) 
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plausibility of the distinction based on ‘health benefits’ can be challenged from at least 
two directions. The first direction involves critiquing the studies that purport to show 
health benefits in the male case, and/or arguing that even if these benefits do exist, 
they are not sufficient to outweigh the costs and harms. This is a common strategy, 
and it reflects the dominant view of health professionals who have considered the 
matter outside the US.93  
The second direction for challenging the distinction is less common, and relies on the 
fact that the apparent difference between male and female forms of genital cutting with 
respect to health benefits may in large part be a consequence of the current legal 
situation, rather than a valid prior justification for it. Specifically, as alluded to above, 
due to the fact that all forms of FGC are prohibited by law in Western countries, it is 
not possible to conduct an adequately-controlled scientific study to determine whether 
a minor, sterilized form of the procedure in childhood would in fact confer some kind or 
degree of health benefit. And yet the vulva, compared to the penis, provides if 
anything an even more hospitable environment to bacteria, yeasts, viruses, and so 
forth, such that removing moist folds of tissue (with a sterile surgical instrument) might 
very well reduce the risk of associated problems.  
We do not advocate that this be done. We are simply pointing out that the claimed 
lack of health benefits for childhood FGC is based on a near-exclusive focus on its 
most invasive and least hygienic forms, and on a paucity of research into any possible 
health advantages that might be associated with its more minor and most hygienic 
forms. As the medical historian Robert Darby has pointed out, official bodies working 
                                                 
93 Ibid. See also M Frisch et al., ‘Cultural Bias in the AAP’s 2012 Technical Report and Policy 
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against FGC including the World Health Organization (WHO) ‘have condemned 
medicalization of the procedure and funded massive research programs into the harm 
of the surgery’. He sees it as ironic that: 
WHO also frames male circumcision as a public health issue - but from the 
opposite starting point. Instead of a research program to study the possible 
harms of circumcision, it funds research into [its] benefits …. In neither case, 
however, is the research open-ended: in relation to women the search is for 
damage, in relation to men it is for benefits; and since the initial assumptions 
influence the outcomes, these results are duly found.94  
Even so, as we have suggested, the health benefits that have been attributed to male 
circumcision, particularly as it is performed in childhood, and particularly in the 
Western context that is most relevant to the legal reasoning employed by Munby LJ 
and others, are generally agreed to be modest at best. This conclusion is further 
strengthened when the claimed benefits are weighed against the countervailing risks 
and other drawbacks of circumcision and the fact that they are generally achievable by 
other, less invasive, more autonomy-respecting means (that is, safer sex practices 
and basic hygiene).95  
 
 
CULTURE VS. RELIGION 
 
                                                 
94 R Darby, 'Moral Hypocrisy' (n 40), 157. 
95 See M Frisch et al., ‘Cultural Bias’ (n 93). 
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What about the plausibility of the distinction based on religion? According to Munby LJ, 
‘FGM has no basis in any religion [whereas] male circumcision is often performed for 
religious reasons’.96 This is a common view. As Margherita Brusa and Y. Michael 
Barilan note, this distinction between cultural and religious motivations is widespread 
in the popular imagination: 
 
It is implied that ‘religious’ [i.e., male] circumcision deserves protection and 
even assistance on the grounds of respect for people’s faiths and own 
perception of divine commandments, whereas ‘cultural’ [i.e., female] 
circumcision is more like a habit that deserves less tolerance.97 
 
This view is problematic for at least two reasons, both of which challenge Munby LJ’s 
attempted resolution of the paradox concerning harm. First, there is a good argument 
to be made that, within Islam at least, the religious justification for female genital 
cutting is no weaker, on textual grounds, than it is for male genital cutting, as we shall 
detail.98 And second, even if a practice were only cultural in nature, this would not 
entail that it was any less deserving of moral or legal respect. Indeed, whilst human 
rights were not raised in the court, international human rights provisions protect both 
religion and culture.99  Moreover, case law both domestically and in the European 
Court of Human Rights has stressed equal protection and provided an expansive 
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definition of culture or belief. In terms of European jurisprudence on belief, what is 
required for legal protection is that a belief attains ‘a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’.100 In fact, in the month that followed B and G, 
the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal held that what is required is that a belief is 
‘fundamental or integral to a person’s individuality and daily life’. 101  As such, the 
cultural or religious origins of a belief or sense of obligation do not determine the level 
of its legal protection.  
To return to our first point, although FGC is often associated with Islamic culture, no 
mention of FGC is found in the Qur’an: this is often taken as evidence that the practice 
is not religious. 102  However, just as in Judaism and Christianity where ‘binding 
religious obligations can arise from oral teachings and extrabiblical sources (e.g., 
rabbinic teachings, papal encyclicals), Islam looks to other sources to interpret and 
supplement Koranic teachings’,103 such as the Hadith, the prophetic sayings of the 
prophet Mohammed. Accordingly, as Alex Myers notes,  
[I]n Sunni Islam, the dominant branch of Islam, two of the four schools of 
jurisprudence, Shafi’i and Hanbali, consider Type 1 female circumcision to be 
obligatory, while the other two schools, Maliki and Hanafi, recommend the 
practice. The scriptural support for this is no weaker than that for male 
                                                 
100 Campbell and Cosans v UK, App. No. 7511/76, 22 March 1983. 
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circumcision—both are derived from the secondary source of Islamic law… the 
Hadith … and neither is to be found in the Qur’an.104  
 
To assert that because it is not in the Qur’an it is not part of the religion is, as Dena 
Davis notes, ‘as nonsensical as telling a Roman Catholic that because there is no 
prohibition against abortion in the Bible she cannot claim to be opposed to abortion on 
religious grounds’.105 Arora and Jacobs similarly argue that outsiders to a religious 
tradition ‘cannot infer the practices of a religious system from a literal reading of its 
canonical texts.’ So, for example, ‘It is no more possible to define Islam within the four 
corners of the Quran than to define Christianity (which includes traditions ranging from 
Presbyterian to Pentecostal to Greek Orthodoxy) solely from a reading of the Bible’. 
Rather, ‘the content of religious belief and practice are guided by interpretive texts and 
traditions’.106  
 
With respect to genital cutting practices in particular, Brusa and Barilan explain that 
the claimed distinction between the religious and the cultural is also historically 
unfounded: ‘Research on the historical development of [both male and female] 
circumcision demonstrates very intricate links bridging religion, institutions of social 
power and metamorphoses in meaning and practice over time and space.’ In practice 
as well as conceptually, then, religion and culture are not abstract, independent 
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entities that maintain stable logical relationships with each other. 107 Supportive of this 
view is the work of Francis Raday, who argues that the schematic separation of 
culture and religion ‘does not accurately represent the way in which traditionalist 
cultures and religion actually interact… [as] there appears to be a correlation between 
certain cultural practices and the religious environments in which they thrive.’108 But 
even if religion and culture were conceptually distinct, independent entities, there 
would be little reason to think that a cultural practice was less worthy of legal 
protection than a religious one. Importantly, in a context in which we are looking at 
how law treats male and female children differently, Brusa and Barilan suggest that 
the distinction between religion and culture reflects biases in both class and gender. 
As they point out, the religiously educated (disproportionately men) locate and justify 
their practices in theological terms, while those less versed in official theological 
teaching (disproportionately women), may explain their equally valued goals in 
‘cultural’ terms that are perceived to be less authoritative. The authors state: 
 
[W]e do not see a reason for trying to rank the value of circumcision to 
Senegalese Christians relative to those of tribal Africans or observant Muslims. 
In the same vein, we do not suppose that the few religious sentiments of a 
secular person, even an atheist, deserve less consideration than the religious 
values of the most piously orthodox, or of one who follows the ways of an 
ethnic group without adherence to any creed whatsoever.109  
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Davis makes a related point, asking her readers to compare two scenarios which she 
populates with a series of ‘matched’ couples. In the first scenario, she refers to a 
deeply religious Muslim couple who believe that they are religiously obligated to cut 
their daughter’s genitals. In respect of this, they are willing to accept a medicalised 
ritual ‘nick’ to meet this obligation. Davis matches this couple with a similarly religious 
Jewish couple who wish to have their son cut in a religious ceremony. In these 
circumstances, and sitting comfortably with Munby LJ’s initial reasoning, Davis argues 
that it is difficult to square why the first couple’s actions would be illegal and the 
second’s not. Further, ‘If we imagine that the Muslim girl's experience will be a tiny 
nick with proper pain control in a hospital context, while the Jewish boy's experience 
will be a somewhat larger operation by a nonmedical practitioner without adequate 
pain control, the justification becomes even more difficult’.110  
In Davis’s second scenario, a Jewish couple is planning a circumcision performed by a 
physician in a surgical setting. Whilst the couple state that they will not educate him 
religiously and do not know if he will ever join a synagogue, they believe that to leave 
him uncut is ‘unthinkable’. To leave him uncut ‘will make him look odd to his Jewish 
friends, may have a negative effect on his ability to marry a Jewish girl, and will bring 
down the wrath of their parents.’111 Davis matches this couple with a sub-Saharan 
African couple vague about their religious beliefs but who feel that to leave their 
daughter uncut will be in some sense un-Islamic. Further: ‘they have good reason to 
fear that their daughter, if left uncircumcised, will be laughed at, perhaps ostracized, 
and have a very difficult time marrying within their culture’. As she concludes, and as 
                                                 
110 DS Davis, ‘Male and Female Genital Alteration’ (n 11), 565. 
111 Ibid. 
 36 
we are inclined to agree, it is difficult to locate a sound justification for respecting the 
first couple's ‘mix of beliefs and custom, but not the second’.112  
LEGAL IRRITANTS AND CHANGE 
In the preceding sections we have challenged the validity, coherence, and consistency 
of the distinctions that are often used to justify differential treatment of male and 
female genital cutting. In doing this we identify certain ‘irritants’, questioning the 
sustainability of the current legal position. 113  Until recently, the conventional 
distinctions have relied on forms of knowledge that have been relatively secure from 
such irritation by activists and academics. Religion and medicine have both functioned 
as ‘black boxes’ absorbing inconsistencies, contradictions and challenge.114 There is 
now significant dissent in terms of health-based claims, and changes in medicine 
more generally – including evidence-based practice and clinical guidelines – have 
further dented this black box. Religion, by contrast, remains more secure although the 
identification of ‘harm’ threatens this status: in other contexts, Western law does not 
allow parents to harm their children simply because it is called for or sanctioned by 
some religion.115 The religious black box is also threatened by a growing body of 
scholarship that challenges the distinction between religion and culture, as well as by 
work that seeks to foreground the lack of homogeneity in religious practice. In terms of 
the latter, one might draw attention to the adoption by some Jewish communities of 
the brit shalom welcoming ceremony (which is gender neutral and which does not 
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involve any genital cutting) as an alternative to the traditional brit milah. 116  Legal 
change may thus continue, as these black boxes are opened and additional light is 
cast on the complexity of what is ‘usually taken to be simple and inevitable’.117  
Viewed through the lens of children’s rights, the standing of B and G is ambiguous. 
Whilst Munby LJ identifies MGC as causing significant harm, this is nevertheless done 
in the specific context of Section 31 – and the harm is then characterised as arising 
from parental behaviour that in 2015 the law ‘is still prepared to tolerate’. This limited 
reading played out in the case of Re L and B (children) (Specific Issues: Temporary 
Leave to Remove from the Jurisdiction; Circumcision)118 that was heard just over a 
year after B and G. The case involved a dispute between separated parents regarding 
the care and upbringing of two boys aged 6 and 4. This case concerned, inter alia, an 
application by the father to have the two boys circumcised in accordance with the 
Muslim faith in which the children were being raised. The mother objected to the 
cutting of the boys and argued that this should be left for the boys themselves to 
decide when they were competent to make the decisions. In assessing the legal 
position regarding circumcision, Roberts J provides a detailed account of Re J 
[1999],119  Re S [2004]120  and the judgement that has served as the basis of our 
analysis. In addressing B and G, Roberts J observed that according to Munby LJ, 
‘‘‘reasonable” parenting is treated as permitting male circumcision’.121 In other words, 
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in the first case since B and G we see that Munby LJ’s careful consideration of MGC 
has been reduced to its conservative conclusion.  
There are three points to note, however. First, Roberts J declined to make the order 
allowing the father to circumcise the two boys. She claimed that she was ‘simply 
deferring that decision to the point where each of the boys themselves will make their 
individual choices once they have maturity and insight to appreciate the 
consequences and longer term effects of the decisions which they reach’.122 This is 
consistent with the earlier post-separation cases of Re J and Re S and moves us 
towards a consensus in such cases and in the academic literature. This recognises a 
child’s right to bodily integrity and to participate in important decision-making that 
affects them.123 
Secondly, whilst we see a rather minimal (if legally correct) response to Munby LJ’s 
wider reasoning, the potential impact of his statement regarding the comparability of 
harms is nevertheless still great: it is an authoritative statement by one of the UK’s 
leading judges. The legal and cultural life of judicial statements can be unpredictable 
and designating MGC as causing ‘significant harm’ may have effects beyond the 
confines of the case and the specific consideration of Section 31. Yet whether this 
happens will rely, to a large extent, on the response of activists and academics. As we 
have emphasized, these groups may provide critiques that function as irritations, 
‘provoking the legal system to reconsider and abandon’ the inadequate solutions it 
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proposes to the paradoxes it creates.124 Here Munby LJ’s less than wholehearted turn 
to the religion/culture and therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinctions provides a renewed 
focus for these activists and academics.  
Finally, there is one more paradox that remains to be addressed. Following the line of 
cases Re J, Re S, and Re L and B there is authority for stating that in post-separation 
families where there is disagreement about the cutting of a male child’s genitals, the 
decision is likely to be deferred until the boy is old enough to make this decision for 
himself. This recognises the harm, pain and risks involved, as well as the child's right 
to make decisions regarding his own body and permanent marks of religious 
affiliation.125 The paradox here is that the law only recognises the child as having 
these rights when the parents disagree. Where the parents agree, these rights are not 
protected. 
 CONCLUSIONS  
Many scholars now view the non-consensual, medically unnecessary surgical 
alteration of male, female, and indeed intersex children’s genitals as morally 
impermissible, and a growing minority endorse efforts to eliminate these practices. In 
this article, we have challenged the differential treatment of genital cutting on the basis 
of gender, highlighting recent changes in understandings of harm and echoing the way 
in which other harms experienced by children have become knowable at different 
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times. 126  Further, we have interrogated two distinctions that are often uncritically 
asserted to justify the current legal position, and we have found that they do not 
withstand scrutiny. Our analysis has relevance to other parental actions where claims 
to therapeutic benefit or religious observance are used to justify choices that may 
violate children’s rights. Specifically, the analysis presented here should provoke 
greater scrutiny of the cultural and historical particularities of such distinctions and 
demarcations. Whilst our analysis is most relevant to shaping surgeries where the 
designation therapeutic/non-therapeutic is contested, it is also relevant to other 
parental decision-making in non-medical contexts where fundamental rights, such as 
the right to education, may be violated. 
The ultimate afterlife of B and G cannot be anticipated with certainty. It might be that 
the potential significance of Munby LJ’s approach to harm is lost as subsequent cases 
side-line his nuanced analysis, as occurred with L and B.127 Alternatively, it might be 
that the judgment inspires movement towards a point at which male and female forms 
of non-therapeutic genital alteration are no longer discussed in separate discourses, 
whether from a legal or moral perspective. This alternative future is possible when we 
consider law according to a systems theoretical approach that foregrounds its 
contingent management of local paradoxes and the generative potential of challenging 
its inconsistencies: 
[P]aradoxes are far from being simply technical problems, quietly impelling 
legal evolution. Rather they constitute points of entry for political struggle in law 
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and, thus, a focus for multiple strategies to establish and re-establish the terms 
and arrangements of social life.128 
In this article we have identified ‘points of entry’ for those who regard the law as it 
currently stands as falling short of protecting and equally valuing all children’s rights to 
bodily integrity.129 Society must now consider how tolerant it is willing to be of practices 
which permanently shape children’s bodies in the service of culture or religion, before 
the child can make his or her own determination. 
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